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Step-In Right as a Lender Protection Mechanism
in Project Financed Transactions
Murat Madykov*
This Article looks at the interesting and complex structure of step-in
right in the context of project finance deals.
By default, lenders include step-in provision in project finance contracts
to have a right to intervene in the project if it comes into difficulty.
Indeed, when the sole guarantee for lenders is the security over the pro-
ject's assets (in effect, financed by the lenders) the opportunity to inter-
fere with contract relations of the project appears to be a powerful tool
to revitalize the project. However, step-in right can be associated with
serious legal and practical challenges and constraints, which can sub-
stantially limit or even nullify the effect of this protection strategy. This,
of course, invites the question of the overall effectiveness of step-in
right.
This Article discusses the meaning of step-in right and analyzes why
lenders may want to include it in financing contracts. The Article pro-
vides that the economic value of the project is not its physical assets
serving as a security but contractual arrangements allowing the project
run; therefore, the right to step-in can be viewed as a perfect way to take
control of the project and remedy the default situation. This Article
also reviews different variations of step-in right and related contractual
arrangements, events triggering step-in right and step-out considera-
tions. The Article further shows how various jurisdictions may regulate
lenders' rights and liabilities and thus affect the step-in activities. Fi-
nally, this Article seeks to answer the key question about the step-in
mechanism: is the step-in right a plausible remedy for a lender in pro-
ject financed transactions?
Upon discussion of various challenges and constraints associated with
the step-in right, the Article argues that there cannot be a single concrete
answer to the question of step-in right plausibility, however the Article
* Harvard Law School LL.M. Graduate, Associate at Colibri Kazakhstan LLP, 114A
Tulebyaev Street, Almaty, 05000, Kazakhstan, mmadykov@llm14.law.harvard.edu. The author
thanks Prof. Howell Jackson, Prof. Benjamin Esty, Prof. Henry Lee, Prof. Kathleen M. Phelps,
Prof. John T. ("Jack") Wallace, Prof. Philip Wood QC (Hon), and Prof. Todd Rakoff. The author
also thanks Mr. Harvey Wagar for his editorial advice.
274 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:273
proposes various measures that might be helpful for a potential lender
to increase the efficiency of step-in right.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Large-scale infrastructure, mining, energy and other industrial and
development projects provide essential pillars for global economic
growth. Many of these projects, in both developed and developing
countries, have been financed through the medium of project finance.
Project finance is "the raising of funds on a limited-recourse or nonre-
course basis" to finance separate capital investment projects where
"providers of the funds look primarily to the cash flow from the pro-
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ject as the source of funds to service their loans and provide the return
of and a return on their equity invested in the project."'
"Project financing has proved a very powerful tool for financing
around the globe" over the last decades. 2 "Although gathering relia-
ble data is rather difficult, it is estimated that the value of investment
brought about by project financing amounts to around EUR 200 bil-
lion globally every year. ' 3 Such investment projects "can be found
across the world in a range of sectors such as transport (e.g., roads,
railways, airports, ports, light rail), energy (generation and distribu-
tion), environment (e.g., water and wastewater treatment and distri-
bution, waste treatment), and social infrastructure (e.g., hospitals,
schools, government buildings)."' 4 To ensure financing for the project,
investors usually involve a bank or "a syndicate of banks as a lender
who will provide loans to the project." 5 The lender is the person who
bears the risk of the project company's failure to fulfill the project. In
this respect, when preparing a project financed transaction, the lender
always needs a proper structure for its protection strategy.
"Step-in right" is one of the standard protection arrangements in
project financed transactions. In general terms, "step-in" means a
right of the lender to step into the shoes of the project company as a
service provider. 6 However, there is no standard definition of "step-
in."
In its most traditional sense, it means that the [lender] (or its nomi-
nee) steps in to manage the project company's own resources used
to provide the services. Or, more practically, it can mean that the
[lender] either [temporarily] steers the services away from the [pro-
ject company] or merely interposes a much greater level of hands-
on management and control over the project company's service
delivery." 7
1. JOHN D. FINNERTY, PROJECT FINANCING: ASSET-BASED FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 1 (2d ed.
2007).
2. See Dario Scannapieco, Scannapieco's Forward to STEFANO GATTI, PROJECT FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE: DESIGNING, STRUCTURING, AND FINANCING PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
PROJECTS Xviii, xxiii (2nd ed. 2012).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. An Introduction to Project Finance Documents, OUT-LAw.COM (Aug. 2011), http://
www.out-law.com/en/topics/financial-services/project-finance/an-introduction-to-project-fin
ance-documents/.
6. Sue McLean, Alistair Maughan, & Scott Stevenson, Step-in to the Real World? (How to
Ensure That Your Outsourcing Step-in Rights are Effective and Enforceable), MORRISON &
FOERSTER LLP CLIENT ALERT 1 (Apr. 12, 2011), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
110407-Step-in-to-the-Real-World.pdf.
7. Id. at 1-2.
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As a regular box-checking exercise, lenders are advised to include a
step-in right within the financing agreement. However, both advisors
and financing institutions often underestimate the legal and practical
challenges associated with such inclusion." Upon a closer look, these
challenges could be substantial, as they may lead to unenforceability
of the step-in right provision and ultimate failure of the project. Tak-
ing this into account, the goal of this Article is to determine whether
the step-in right is a plausible remedy for a lender in project financed
transactions.
In pursuing this goal, the Article will assess the theoretical and
practical understanding of the step-in right concept. The Article will
review, first, what constitutes the step-in right mechanism, the ratio-
nale behind it and key practical variations of step-in right. Viewing
the step-in right as a complex contract law structure, the Article will
also explore the regulation of lenders' rights and liabilities with re-
spect to third parties in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, to answer
the question of the plausibility of the step-in right, the Article will
identify and try to weigh the potential benefits of the step-in right
against the challenges and constraints related to its exercise. Namely,
it will explore various risks related to triggering the step-in right, tech-
nical features of the project and lender's capacity, relationships with
management and employees of the project company, government au-
thorizations, and open competition requirements.
It must be recognized that due to lack of wide experience in the
exercise of the step-in right, 9 some of the problems discussed in this
Article may seem theoretical. However, these are the problems which
the lender should be prepared for when drafting the step-in right
clause and, moreover, when the project comes into difficulty.
This Article will use several types of analyses. It will primarily em-
ploy a traditional theoretical analysis of the existing approaches to the
subject at issue. The Article will also use a comparative law analysis
8. See generally Maria AtaiDe Cordeiro, Country Report, Portugal: Banks' Step-in Rights
under the Portuguese Public Contract Code: Exercise by Means of Transfer of Shares, 6 EUR.
PUB. PRIVATE P'sHiP L. REV. 164, 164 (2011).
9. E.g., Interview with Philip Wood QC (hon), Special Global Counsel for Allen & Overy
LLP, Head of Allen & Overy Global Law Intelligence Unit, Visiting Professor in Int'l Fin. Law
at the Univ. of Oxford, Yorke Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Univ. of Cambridge, Visiting
Professor at Queen Mary College, Univ. of London (Mar 11, 2014) (a lawyer with 40 years of
experience in international banking and finance, has noted that he has "never heard of the step-
in right being exercised") (on file with author); Telephone Interview with John T. Wallace, Lec-
turer at Law, Boston University School of Law, Managing Dir., Sr. Counsel & Practice Grp.
Leader, Fixed Income, N. Am. Inv. L. for John Hancock Fin. Servs.. Inc. (Mar. 13, 2014) (making
same comment) (on file with author).
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by contrasting the views of the step-in right in the U.S., the U.K. and
French contract law traditions.
II. WHAT IS STEP-IN RIGHT?
A. Step-In Right as Part of Security System
Transferring control over the project to a lender under a contract
constitutes the step-in right mechanism. The parties to this mecha-
nism appear to correspond to the key parties to the common project
financed transaction:
* Lenders: financial or bank institutions that provide funds for the
project to the [project company or] Single Purpose Vehicle
("SPV").
* Sponsors [or grantors]: . . . the shareholders or companies that
[organized the project company]. They provide some funding and
guarantees for the project.
* [Project Company]: an entity.., created with the single purpose
of [implementing] a project.
* Contractors: parties in charge of developing and overlooking the
construction of the project [(e.g., companies responsible for con-
struction of pipeline)].
• Sub-contractors: parties providing ancillary or specialty services
related to the project [(e.g., companies supplying and installing
pipes, installing and testing measurement and control equipment,
etc.)]. 10
Although project finance may be defined through the terms of co-
operation among the above parties, it should ultimately be considered
as an aggregation of legal contracts that allocate resources and risks.
Indeed, a "typical project has 40 or more contracts uniting 15 parties
in a vertical chain from input supplier to output purchaser."11
The center of project finance is a loan (credit) agreement that con-
trols the entire financing deal;12 the step-in right is a part of the pro-
tection system securing the interests of the lender provided in or
arising out of the loan agreement. As a rule, inclusion of an agreed
security package is usually a condition precedent to disbursement of
10. Antoine A. Maggiar, Step-in Rights: Report for France, 56th Congress of Int'l Assoc. of
Lawyers 2 (Oct. 31 - Nov. 4, 2012), available at http://www.uianet.org/en/programme/congres/
11455 ("follow "Reports" under "56th Congress"; then follow "Download in" hyperlink under
"Step-in rights in financial transactions - France") (last visited Dec. 22, 2014).
11. BENJAMIN C. ESTY, MODERN PROJECT FINANCE: A CASEBOOK 2 (2004).
12. GA-ri, supra note 2, at 277.
278 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:273
the loan.13 Authors writing on project finance are more or less in
agreement as to what normally constitutes the security package:1 4
(a) pledge on project company shares;
(b) security on the project company's receivables;
(c) security on the project company's bank accounts;
(d) mortgage on the project's real property (i.e., construction site,
plant to be built, etc.);
(e) security on other project company assets, (provided that they
have economic value and are permitted to be used as security in the
respective jurisdiction); and
(f) direct agreements.' 5
For the purpose of this research, a direct agreement poses the most
interest. A direct agreement is a contract "executed directly by the
lenders and the key counterparties to the project [contract],"'1 6 such as
sponsors, project company, contractors and sub-contractors.' 7 "The
objective of a direct agreement is to grant the lender certain legal
rights that apply when the relevant project contract is threatened with
termination[.]' 18 "Direct agreements are also sometimes sought from
the authorities issuing consents necessary for the project" and those
parties providing necessary items (e.g., sponsor providing land neces-
sary for a pipeline project). 19 The following standard provisions of the
direct agreement are the most important:
The lender[ ] is given a 'cure period' (i.e., extra time to take ac-
tion to remedy the Project Company's default in addition to that
given to the Project Company) before the [project company's]
contract 2 0 is terminated. These cure periods are limited in length,
... [sufficient for] the lender[ I to tak[e] active steps to find a
solution to the problem.
13. See id. at 276.
14. See id.; see also ESTEBAN C. BULJEVICH & YOON S. PARK, PROJECT FINANCING AND THE
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 113 (1999).
15. Id. at 301-304.
16. Id. In this Article, "project contract" means various types of contracts in a project finance
transaction, such as concession contract, EPC, services contract, loan agreement, supply con-
tract, etc.
17. In public-private partnership/private finance initiative (PPP/PFI) arrangements, the direct
agreement is a three-way (tripartite) agreement among the public authority, project company
and the lender. Tim C. Meaney, DZ Bank, PPP Project Financing: The Role of Direct Agree-
ments in a PPP Project 3 (Sept. 20, 2005), available at http://www.eu.gov.hk/english/cmps/
cmps_20050930.html.
18. Id. at 3.
19. GRAHAM D. VINTER ET AL., PROJECT FINANCE: A LEGAL GUIDE 273 (3d ed. 2006).
20. For example, this situation may relate to performance of an insurance contract when the
project company is default in payment of an insurance premium to the insurance company. In
this case the lender can pay the outstanding insurance premium instead of the project company
and thus cure the default.
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* The lender[ ] ha[s] the right to 'Step-In' to the contract during the
cure period. This means that [it] can appoint a nominee to under-
take the Project Company's rights in parallel with the Project
Company [or substitute the project company].
* The lender[ ] ... will [normally] not assume any additional liabil-
ity as a result of Step-In or substitution [unless the lender exer-
cises the step-in right itself].
" The Project Company undertakes . . . not to obstruct the
lender[']s exercise of [its] Step-In and substitution rights.21
A direct agreement serves both defensive and offensive functions;
defensive "in that it protects the [lender] against a precipitous termi-
nation of the project contract by the other contracting party [and of-
fensive] in that it allows the [lender] to seize control of the project
company's rights under the project contract upon the general enforce-
ment of its security. '22 It can be used by the lender as a "convenient
instrument in which to place undertakings between the relevant con-
tractual counterparty and the banks. '23 For example, a direct agree-
ment can extend a license to use the counterparty's intellectual
property rights from the project company to the lender.24
A direct agreement is "usually negotiated at the same time as the
project contracts[ ] and the form of the direct agreement is set out as
an annex to the project contract. '25 It is also "known as a 'consent to
assignment' if this is the main purpose of the agreement. '"26
A direct agreement is an essential component of a project financed
transaction and the risks which may arise out of it should be given a
due consideration and careful assessment. Among the main risks
mentioned by practitioners when discussing direct agreements, the
key one is the complexity that "can arise when the contractor is also
the [principal] shareholder of the [project company]. '27 In the case of
hostile relationship with the contractor "following a default by the
[project company],... the lender[ ] may be forced to allow the [pro-
ject] contract to be terminated. '28 This can happen because it is
"[p]ractically very difficult to replace the contractor," as the project
finance contract usually contains a "completion date default provision
which may [provide] the lender with limited time to cure the underly-
21. E.R. YESCOMBE, PRINCIPLES OF PROJECT FINANCE 195 (2d. ed. 2014).
22. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 274.
23. Id. at 277.
24. Id.
25. See YESCOMBE, supra note 21, at 194.
26. Id. at 194 n.22.
27. Meaney, supra note 17, at 12.
28. Id.
279
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ing default event. ' 29 The following will discuss other significant risks
related to exercising step-in rights.
B. Why Step-In Right?
Prior to exploring the various practical variations of the step-in
right, it would be advisable to understand why such structure exists
and why it might be important from the lender's perspective. It is
clear that in project finance, project revenues are typically "the only
source of loan reimbursement. ' 30 Therefore, "lenders actually find
themselves in a rather weak position" de facto if the project company
faces financial difficulties despite availability of the huge "system of
contract solutions and security interests that lenders can rely on" in
project finance deals.31 For instance, unlike in corporate financing, in
project finance, the payment acceleration solution is quite illusory.32
Most of the available liquidity generated by the project company, ex-
cluding the liquidity essential to the survival of the project, is chan-
neled to repay lenders.33 Acceleration of the loans "does not generate
the financial resources needed to repay the loan, and by definition the
project company does not have any reserve funds that it would have
available to pay immediately to lenders in case of acceleration. '34
Equally illusory is the option of enforcing security interests.35 "To
benefit from security means to have a priority right to sell the secured
item and retain the proceeds of the sale .... ",36 However, this makes
sense "if the security in question has its own independent value and
was secured on the basis of that value. In project finance, the perspec-
tive is completely different [because] [s]ecurity is created in every-
thing that has to do with the project. '37 In other words, the key assets
of the project company "are not the physical assets but the contractual
agreements which form the basis of the [project finance] arrange-
ments. ' 38 "The project has value only if it is up and running and can
generate revenues, which are used to repay the project loan and to
compensate sponsors. '39 "The individual economic value of the assets
29. Id.
30. GATrI, supra note 2, at 305.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 306.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. GATTI, supra note 2, at 306.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Meaney, supra note 17, at 7.
39. GATTI, supra note 2, at 306.
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that are subject to security" is not comparable to the amount of the
loan; moreover,
this value shrinks even more if the project defaults, which is pre-
cisely when the issue of security enforcement comes into play....
These are the reasons why [the] step-in right[ ] emerge[s] as a possi-
ble solution available to [the lender] in case the project faces a fi-
nancial crisis. By means of such legal instrument..., [the lender] is
entitled to take control of the project in order to remedy or make
arrangements to remedy the default situation, as far as possible.40
Another argument for invoking the step-in right into the project
finance arrangement is bankability. In order for an investment initia-
tive to be made under project finance, the project should be bankable.
This means that it should have project contracts containing certain le-
gal provisions protecting the project company.41
Losing project contracts (which can happen.., due to default by
the project company) means jeopardizing the bankability of the pro-
ject. This explains why lenders want to [have a right] to intervene
directly [or indirectly] with respect to counterparties to project [con-
tracts] if the project company is at risk of losing project contracts. 42
In other words, it is in the lender's interest to put a step-in right provi-
sion in the direct agreement to mitigate the risk of project contract
termination because of force-majeure or default by the project com-
pany.43 The lender's mitigation strategy may also include divesting the
project company of the project contracts by assigning them to a third
party - a possible buyer of the project who would step-in instead of the
lender. 44 In addition to these, the provisions granting the step-in right
may also give the lender the right to be informed about the status of
the project and any possible threats of termination of the project
contracts.4
5
C. Variations of the Step-In Right
The lender usually wants to ensure that the project company will
continue with the project after step-in. Moreover, the lender itself is
not willing to be involved in the actual step-in. The lender generally
mandates a "substitute" or "nominee" to step-in instead of the
lender.4 6 Based on this, there are "three different levels of lender in-
40. See id. at 306; see also JEFFREY DELMON, PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT IN INFRASTRUC-
TURE: PROJECT FINANCE, PPP PROJECTS AND RISK 82 (2nd ed. 2009).
41. See GATrI, supra note 2, at 304.
42. Id. at 304.
43. See id. 304-05.
44. See id. at 305.
45. Id.
46. See YESCOMBE, supra note 21, at 195.
282 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:273
tervention in the project: cure right, step-in right (in the strict sense)
and novation/substitution. ' '47
1. Cure Right
The cure right allows "the lender[ ] to cure a breach of an obligation
of the project company under one of the project documents. ' 48 For
example, a need for using the cure right may arise when the project
company constructing a pipeline is in arrears on its payments to its
contractor for the pipeline construction services. In this case, to pre-
vent the potential termination of the construction contract, the lender
can cure the situation by paying the outstanding amount to the con-
tractor instead of the project company.
"Lenders are generally hesitant to involve themselves in the cure of
a project company breach unless the cure is limited to the payment of
the amount due" by the project company to other persons (e.g., pay-
ment of insurance premiums to an insurance company, property taxes
to the government). 49 If the lender does not exercise its right to cure
the breach within the established cure period, the project company's
counterparty "may proceed under its contractual remedies" (e.g.,
damages).50 In Jeffrey Delmon's opinion, a cure right cannot be con-
sidered as a step-in right as it has a limited application, i.e., applied
when "the default simply requires payment of [money], but otherwise
the project company is performing well" and there is no substantial
threat of project contract termination.51
2. Step-In Right (In the Strict Sense)
The step-in right arises where a "project company breaches one of
the project documents and the relevant project participant chooses to
terminate. "52
The lenders are given a chance to step-in with the project company,
cure the relevant breach and put the project back on track. The
other project participants [e.g., contractors, suppliers, customers]
will be required to continue fulfilling their contractual obligations
with the new entity in lieu of the project company, although the
project company will not be released from its obligations under the
47. See DELMON, supra note 40, at 81.
48. Id. at 82.
49. Id.; see Interview with John T. Wallace, supra note 9.
50. DELMON, supra note 40, at 82.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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project documents .... The project company would remain liable
during the step-in and after the step-in period.53
Taking the same pipeline project example as described above, the pos-
sibility of exercising this kind of step-in right may come along when
the project company is not simply behind on its payments, but also
experiences other difficulties posing substantial risk of its default on
the key project contracts, e.g., excessive expenses, serious technical
shortcomings of the project, or low management potential. Once the
lender steps-in and, after improving the situation, steps-out, the pro-
ject company again becomes solely responsible for the project.
3. Novation
The final variation of step-in right implies transfer of all of the pro-
ject company's rights and obligations to a substitute entity and re-
moval of the project company from the project. This type of step-in
right may require consent of "various project participants [e.g. con-
tractors, sub-contractors, or customers]. '54
The difference of novation from the step-in right, in a strict sense, is
mostly a legal one: when the project company experiences severe diffi-
culties, the lender instead of keeping the project company liable for
the project can novate the whole project to another company which is
more capable or fulfilling the project.
Another way of stepping in can be acquiring control over the pro-
ject company through appropriating under contract the voting rights
granted by its shares55 and replacing the project company's board of
directors.56 This is not a step-in right in its conventional meaning, as it
does not deal directly with preventing termination of contracts by
counterparties; however, it can also be widely applied because of its
potential effectiveness and simplicity.
Although it is very uncommon, instead of a step-in right some pro-
ject financed structures might provide for the lender's obligation to
step-in. For instance, an English case, The Royal Bank of Scotland
PLC v. Chandra, is an interesting illustration of a bank agreeing to
include into the agreement "a mandatory provision, requiring the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. There might be a stricter contractual arrangement providing the lender with the right to
acquire shares in the project company in the case of default. See Jane Eespold & Reimo Ham-
merberg, Possibility to Use and Enforce Lender's Step-in Rights in Baltic PPP Projects: Part One
- Estonia, THOMSON REUTERS 1 (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.sorainen.com/UserFiles/File/Publica
tions/article.possibility-to-use-and-enforce-lenders-step-in-rights-in-baltic-ppp-projects-part-one-
estonia.2012-02-21.eng.thomson-reuters.reimoh-janee.pdf.
56. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 295; see also Cordeiro, supra note 8, at 167-68.
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bank to step-in. ' 57 The bank took the "unusual step of agreeing to
this because the contractor [was] concerned about the ability of the
defendants' company to meet its obligations under the building con-
tract and [refused] to enter into the building contract unless the bank
provided some form of security. ' 58 So, the step-in right served as a
part of defendants' collateral warranty. 59 When the project faced dif-
ficulties, the contractor "suspended work[ ] and subsequently gave no-
tice that it wanted the bank to step-in. '60 The contractor "pointed out
to the bank that the step-in provisions in the collateral warranty were
mandatory and not optional. ' 61 The bank was "happy to step-in" via
its nominee "on the basis that, since the development was not far from
practical completion, it was important to retain the original contrac-
tor" and avoid further claims. 62
D. Events Triggering Step-In Right
From a legal point of view, each project document should have "its
own termination regime, with [its own] events of default defined [on
the basis of] the obligations of each party. ' 63 Meanwhile, the events
such as liquidation or bankruptcy or extended force-majeure are com-
mon to all parties. 64 To avoid the reference to the national laws, the
parties to the project financed transaction can try to specify the de-
fault situations and grounds for termination in the respective loan
agreement, direct agreement or other project contract.65 It is clear
that all other project documents should closely follow the termination
provisions stipulated in the key agreements mentioned above.66 The
events that usually allow termination of the project contract, and
therefore triggering the step-in right, are those related to non-per-
57. See Royal Bank of Scottland PLC v. Chandra, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 105, [31], [2010] 1
Lloyd's Rep 677 (Eng.). This case involved a bank seeking to enforce guarantees made by a
business couple in relation to financing their company's hotel construction project. Id. at 1 1.
According to the defendants, the bank by its step-in activities made under the agreement with
the contractor had released them from obligations to it. Id. at 9 16. The court held that the
couple's company was liable to the bank in respect of the liabilities the bank incurred and paid to
the contractor following step-in. Id. at 255.
58. See Bank's Step-In Right under A Collateral Warranty, THE CONSTRUCTION INDEX (Jan.
10, 2010), http://www.theconstructionindex.co.uk/news/view/banks-step-in-rights-under-a-collat
eral-warranty.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. DELMON, supra note 40, at 402.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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formance or insufficient performance by the project company. In ad-
dition to a default on the loan agreement as described above,67 the
following is a preliminary list of such events:
* failure to commence the work within a certain period [as pro-
vided in the project agreement]
* failure to achieve completion within a certain period;
" abandonment of a portion of the project without consent;
" [project company's] bankruptcy;
" replacement of the operator [or contractor] other than in accor-
dance with the [project agreement];
" calling of loans above a certain threshold related to the project;
* failure to achieve a certain level of performance over time; or
" fundamental breach of any of the project documents. 68
In addition, others have found
" a prolonged force majeure event which will, or is likely to, cause a
serious threat to the business;
" a material interruption or delay in the provision of the services;
" a serious risk to the health or safety of persons or property;
" step-in is required to comply with law; and/or
" step-in is required or advised by a regulator 69
also trigger step-in rights.
E. Notification and Step-In Activities, Step-Out
A direct agreement needs "to specify how the [lender] may exercise
its step-in rights (e.g. whether the lender must notify the [project com-
pany and other project participants] in writing that it is exercising its
step-in right" (though the project agreement is supposed to have such
a requirement). 70 The notice is expected to indicate what services the
step-in regime will cover. It is also likely that the direct agreement
and the notice should indicate a backstop date, i.e., the date when the
step-in period ends.71 Of course, the lender "will want its step-in
rights to be as flexible as possible" and retain it until the loan and the
interest accrued on it are paid in full.72 However, this is likely to be
resisted by the project company and project sponsors.73 Instead of
this, the lender should clearly identify all practical constraints relating
to its possible step-in and define for itself the concrete list of services
67. See supra Part II.C.1.
68. DELMON, supra note 40, at 402-03.
69. See McLean et al., supra note 6, at 3.
70. Id.
71. See id.; see also YESCOMBE, supra note 21, at 489.
72. McLean et al., supra note 6, at 3.
73. See id.
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it is able to take over from the project company.74 If, for instance, the
lender is dealing with services provided through a secured data center
and has no detailed knowledge of the relevant processes and proce-
dures, it would definitely not be feasible for the lender to "parachute"
into such center and start telling someone else's employees how to run
the services. 75 In this case, the option with acquiring voting rights and
replacing the board of directors would be more appropriate.
Although the lender is the one who is most keen to avoid bank-
ruptcy procedures for the project company,76 if it fails and the project
company becomes bankrupt, its position becomes much more compli-
cated. In this case, the lender can rely only on the security over the
project company assets as well as try to seek cooperation with the
administrator in bankruptcy. 77 In this scenario, the step-in right again
proves useful: if a third party wishes to buy the project (let's say, an
electric power plant or a pipeline) or any part of it within the bank-
ruptcy procedure, the lender can assist in this by assigning to the new
owner the relevant project contracts. 78
According to some authors, "[t]he period of step-in is [by default] at
lender's discretion and [it] can 'step-out' again whenever [it]
wish[es]." '79 To ensure the lender's right to step-out, however, it is
important to have it clearly provided in the direct agreement.
III. LENDERS' RIGHT AND LIABILITIES WITH RESPECT TO THIRD
PARTIES: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
Although the step-in right concept has not been extensively covered
in the legal and business literature, it is usually described by various
authors, including international institutions, as something common to
lender's interests and incident to the project finance landscape.80
Meanwhile, many have not paid sufficient attention to the most basic
area of step-in right regulation - its effect on the lender's rights and
liabilities with respect to third parties. These are the issues governed
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. GATTI, supra note 2, at 307.
77. See id. at 306.
78. Id.
79. See YESCOMBE, supra note 21, at 195.
80. See generally, e.g., The Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center for
Contracts, Laws and Regulation (PPPIRC), Key Issues in Developing Project Financed Transac-
tions, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/financing/
issues-in-project-financed-transactions (last visited Dec. 22, 2014); United Nations Econ.
Comm'n for Europe, Guidebook on Promoting Good Governance in Public-Private Partner-
ships, UNITED NATIONS (2008), available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/publica-
tions/ppp.pdf.
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by contract law. To cover these issues, this Article will concentrate on
the analysis of third-party contract law implications related to exercis-
ing the step-in right in some common law and civil law jurisdictions,
namely the U.S., the U.K. and France.
A. U.S.: Assignment and Delegation
The underlying concepts governing the regulation and interpreta-
tion of the step-in right in the U.S. are "assignment of rights and dele-
gation of performance of duties." '81
As described in the influential Allan E. Farnsworth's treatise,
Farnsworth on Contracts,
an obligee's transfer of a contract right is known as an assignment of
right. By an assignment, the obligee as assignor (B) transfers to an
assignee (C) a right that the assignor has against an obligor (A). An
obligor's empowering of another to perform the obligor's duty is
known as delegation of the performance of this duty. By a delega-
tion, the obligor as delegating party (B) empowers a delegate (C) to
perform the duty that the delegating party owes to an oblige (A). A
party to a contract that both assigns rights and delegates perform-
ance to another person will be referred to as transferor (B); the
other person will be referred to as transferee (C); and the transac-
tion will be called as transfer of contract.82
When exercising its step-in right, the lender is a transferee, as it ac-
cepts from the project company a number of contracts with contrac-
tors, suppliers, customers, etc. As the application of assignment and
delegation regulations entails, the contracts to be transferred should
be carefully assessed by breaking them down into groups of rights and
obligations.
First of all, it should be noted that not all rights are transferrable.
For instance, the lender cannot be assigned by the project company its
bank deposits or right to payment under public contracts (except for
some exemptions). 83 Moreover, the assignment of some of the project
company's contracts may be considered by a court to be ineffective if
the court finds the assignment violates public policy.84
The lender might be barred from exercising a step-in right when the
relevant contract contains a provision prohibiting assignment. How-
ever, absent a contrary indication, a prohibition of an assignment of
81. 3 EDWARD A. FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 58 (1990).
82. Id.
83. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2014); 41 U.S.C. § 15; U.C.C. § 9-104 (2003).
84. See, e.g., Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967) (finding that an assign-
ment is ineffective as "offend[ing] public policy ... if it provides for the institution of litigation
by and at the expense of a person who, but for that agreement, has no interest in it.")
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"the contract" is to be interpreted as barring only the delegation of
duties not the assignment of rights.85
Another critical risk the lender should avoid is revocability of the
assignment. The general rule in the U.S. is that "gratuitous assign-
ment[s] [are] revocable. ' 86 In this regard, the lender should pay a cer-
tain value for receiving the rights under the contact or provide for
specific language in the direct agreement confirming that the assign-
ment is not made for free, that it is made for meaningful "considera-
tion." According to Farnsworth, even if the project company has the
power to terminate a gratuitous assignment when it is made, the pro-
ject company may lose that power as the result of lender's subsequent
acts (e.g., obtaining the performance from the contractor).87
If the parties provided for "assignment of contract" as a part of the
step-in right mechanism, this language will ordinarily delegate per-
formance as well as assignment the rights.88 "No delegation of per-
formance relieves the project company of any duty to perform or any
liability for breach. ' 89 At the same time, the lender should under-
stand that if it gives a promise to the project company to perform the
duty (including via demonstration of the relevant conduct) this will be
deemed as assumption of the duty by the lender and the lender under-
takes a duty to the project company90 and usually to the project com-
pany's counterparty as the intended beneficiary. 91 It should also be
noted that if the lender assumes the duty and the project company's
counterparty releases the project company in exchange of the new lia-
bility of the lender, this would create a novation making the lender
solely liable for the obligations of the project company. 92
It is perfectly understood that the lender will want to avoid assum-
ing any liabilities under any contract the project company has entered
into with the contractors or to limit its liability to the maximum ex-
85. See U.C.C. § 2-210(3); but see Union Bond & Trust Co. v. M & M Wood Working Co., 474
P.2d 339, 352 (Or. 1970) (finding that "rights or duties created by contract may not be assigned if
they involve the peculiar fitness or ability of the person performing the contract or when the
contract is made by reason of the trust and confidence placed by one party in the other party to
the contract.").
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 332(2) (1981).
87. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 93, at 138.
88. See U.C.C. § 2-210(4); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 328(1).
89. See U.C.C. § 2-210(1).
90. If the delegate fails to perform and the delegating party performs, or is required to pay
damages, the delegating party may recover from the delegate. See e.g., Imperial Ref. Co. v.
Kanotex Ref. Co., 29 F.2d 193, 199-200 (8th Cir. 1928); Cutting Packing Co. v. Packers' Exch. of
Cal., 25 P. 52, 53 (Cal. 1890).
91. See, e.g., Imperial Ref. Co., 29 F.2d at 200.
92. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 93, at 141-42.
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tent. Therefore, to facilitate the interests of the lender, the direct
agreement, including the step-in right provisions, should be properly
drafted. The Model Consent to Assignment for Project Finance
Transactions prepared by the Project Finance and Development Com-
mittee of the ABA Section of Business Law would serve as a perfect
guideline for negotiating and drafting the direct agreement. 93 In addi-
tion to increasing the efficiency of drafting and negotiating the project
documents, the Model Consent to Assignment allows the lender to
mitigate the risks of assuming additional liabilities. 94 At the same
time, the Model Consent to Assignment cannot provide full protec-
tion. Namely, Footnote 29 in the Model Consent to Assignment says
that "the contracting party (e.g., contractor acting as the project com-
pany's obligee) in most cases would also have recourse to the
[lender]" who has stepped in for all its liabilities that arise during the
step-in period.95
B. U.K.: Receiver and Substitute Obligor
As cautioned by Graham Vinter, "the phrase step-in is a notori-
ously vague one and the way that lenders will typically step into an
English company is to appoint an administrative receiver over it."96
Receiver is the "one placed in the custodial responsibility for the
property of others, including tangible and intangible assets and
rights," especially in cases where a company cannot meet its financial
obligations or enters bankruptcy. 97 According to Philip Wood, "the
use by banks of receivership in English-based jurisdictions - a kind of
possessory management of the debtor via an accountant - is extremely
common and has been around for 160 years or so."98 However, ac-
cording to Graham Vinter, "prudence dictates that it will be better for
lenders to be rather more expansive about the arrangement they have
in place for carrying out the project (as would normally be the case in
the typical direct agreement)." 99 Indeed, in 2005 an English court
held that the mere fact that a lender could appoint a receiver was not
93. See Project Finance and Development Committee of ABA Section of Business Law,
Model Consent to Assignment for Project Finance Transactions (with Commentary), ABA (Aug.
1, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/business-lawyer/
2012/67_4/report-finance-transactions-201208.authcheckdam.pdf
94. See id. at 1203.
95. See id. at 1209 n.29.
96. VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 263.
97. See Ken Philip & Kerin Kaminski, Receivership: A Value-Adding Tool, 63 SECURED
LENDER 30, 34-36 (Jan.-Feb. 2007).
98. Interview with Philip Wood, supra note 9.
99. VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 263.
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sufficient to enable the lender to have step-in rights for the purposes
of the project finance transaction. 00
The step-in right (either through receivership or more expansive
practice) is normally stipulated in a direct agreement, and this ap-
proach is widely adopted in the London market.10 ' Moreover, in light
of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, the simple inclu-
sion of the step-in right provision in the underlying project contract
will also "technically ... give the lender the benefit[s]" of a step-in
right provided that it follows the necessary procedures as set out in
the Act.10 2 Namely, "the [project] contract should state that the
lender[ ] . .. [is] able to enforce the relevant [step-in] provisions, the
lender[ ] should notify the [parties to the contract] that [it] relies on
[these] provisions," and the contract should also provide that these
"provisions cannot be rescinded or varied without the lender's
consent."1 03
The receiver is also referred to as "additional obligor" who will be
often jointly and severally liable with the project company during the
step-in period (in effect, it constitutes an "assumption" as described
above). 10 4 As an alternative for an "additional obligor" when exercis-
ing its step-in right, banks may novate the project contract to another
person as part of a trade sale.10 5 The buyer or other designee substi-
tutes for the project company and thus is sometimes referred to as a
"substitute obligor." The substitute obligor, post-novation, will have
sole responsibility under the contract (in effect, it is a "novation" as
described above). 106
Of course, lenders will seek to limit their liability on step-in. They
can insist, for example, that their receiver will only be responsible for
those liabilities of which the project company has been expressly noti-
fied by the lenders. They can also seek to negotiate a cap on the
amount of such liabilities.107 However, it seems that this is hard to
achieve, as the third party will argue that the outstanding liabilities
should be paid as a precondition to any step-in action. 08
100. See Feetum v. Levy, [2005] EWHC (Ch) 349, [59] [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2576 (Eng). It should
be also noted that projects in some sectors (most notably oil and gas projects in the North Sea)
have not, to date, included step-in rights in the strict sense although the lenders were entitled to
appoint receivers.
101. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 280.
102. VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 279.
103. Id.
104. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 275.
105. Id. at 275.
106. See id. at 277.
107. Id. at 103.
108. See id. at 194.
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The new counterparties of the lender will probably object as to the
identity of any proposed substitute obligor taking into account that,
following the novation, the project company will be released from lia-
bility under the contract. The lender, however, will probably seek to
limit the grounds on which the third party can object to a proposed
substitute.
C. France: Lender as Beneficiary
In France, there are legislative provisions dealing with step-in rights
of public authorities; however, there are no such "in favour of banks
or other third parties" 10 9 Indeed, for example, in the 2006 Eurotunnel
case, the validity of step-in rights granted to the banks under the con-
cession was questioned in view of French insolvency rules "[d]espite
the fact that the [Eurotunnel] concession and the step-in rights pro-
vided therein were approved by an international treaty and the [do-
mestic] law of France. '110
Although not properly supported by statutory law, the step-in rights
granted to the lenders in France remain to be pure contractual under-
takings.11 "In the absence of a step-in right provision in the direct
agreement, step-in rights may be structured through [the provision in
the project contract of a] stipulation pour autrui, [the] mechanism pro-
vided in the French civil code and . . . exist[ing] in many civil law
countries."112
By stipulation pour autrui, the obligor (contractor) "undertakes vis-
A-vis a stipulating party [(project company)] to do or not to do some-
thing in favor of a third party beneficiary (lender)." 113 The "interest-
ing feature" of this mechanism is that the lender "does not need to be
a party to the agreement between the [project company] and the [con-
tractor]." 114 The lender "only has to accept by a [single] notification
to the [contractor] that the stipulation pour autrui has been made in its
favor."'1 15 So, under stipulation pour autrui, the contractor "under-
takes vis-A-vis the project company ... to transfer the [project] con-
109. See Maggiar, supra note 10, at 3.
110. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 372 (John Dewar, ed. 2011)
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE]; Treaty of Canterbury, U.K.-Fr., Feb. 12, 1986,
available at http://www.eurotunnelgroup.com.uploadedFiles/assets-uk/the-channel-tunneTreaty-
Canterbury-UK.pdf.
111. See Maggiar, supra note 10, at 9.
112. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE, supra note 110, at 380.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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tract to [the lender] or any party designated by the lender. ' 116
Acceptance of the lender of stipulation pour autrui entitles the lender
to enforce the step-in right[ ].-117
After notifying the project company or the contractor, generally the
lender (or its substitute) "become[s] jointly and severally liable with
the [project company] for [its] obligations under the project [con-
tract]." 118 However, French legislation also provides for the possibil-
ity of "substitution" or "novation," similarly as in the common law
jurisdictions.' 19 According to one French practitioner, "if there is a
transfer of the [project company's] rights and obligations under the
project [contract]," the common rule is that the defaulted project com-
pany is "released from all its obligations, and its rights are
cancelled. 1 20
When deciding which law among those described above should be
chosen to govern the step-in right, it would be important to under-
stand that the step-in right mechanism is driven not only by contrac-
tual arrangements but also various regulations and, which is most
important, existing legal practice. Taking into account that the step-in
right concept has emerged within common law jurisdictions, French
law would not be the best option as governing law. To ensure the
most efficient formulation, interpretation and implementation of the
step-in right, English or American law would be more preferable.
IV. CHALLENGES AND CONSTRAINTS
Prior to including into an agreement a provision about the step-in
right, the lender should identify the potential challenges and con-
straints related to its exercise. Such constraints could be a problem as
they can nullify the effect of exercising a step-in right and raise the
question of its enforceability.1 2 ' Following is a discussion of the other
key challenges and constraints associated with the step-in right that
can relate to various legal, economic and administrative aspects of this
complex legal structure.
116. Id.
117. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE, supra note 110, at 372.
118. Maggiar, supra note 10, at 5.
119. See id. at 3.
120. Maggiar, supra note 10, at 5.
121. Some constraints have been discussed above in the part relating to the contract law regu-
lation of the step-in right. See supra Part II.C.
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A. Technical Features of the Project
If the services are provided by the project company from a remote
location or if the project includes a number of industrial facilities lo-
cated in various jurisdictions, as the case may be for cross-border
pipelines or electricity transmission projects, this may make any im-
mediate step-in extremely difficult from technical perspective.
B. Level of Lenders' Internal Capacity and Expertise
Banks are "not set up to run a step-in service effectively." 122 They
simply do not have the necessary skills and experience that would en-
able them to do this. Lenders are not willing to run the project them-
selves,123 and, moreover, they are often unable to find another party
that is willing and able to step in to the project within a tight
timeframe. According to Henry Lee, he has "seen several cases where
the government pays the second highest bidder a fee to be prepared to
step in to a concession, if the original high bidder does not meet its
obligations. 1 124 Similarly, if the project contract is awarded through
public bids, a possible solution for the lender could be its agreement
with the second bidder.125 For this purpose, the lender in addition to
negotiating with the winner of the bids the conditions of financing the
project, may also try to negotiate with the second bidder the condi-
tions of its step-in to the project as the lender's nominee if the winner
of the bids fails. Thus, the lender will be guaranteed that in the event
of default the lender will be able to substitute the winner by the sec-
ond bidder and, therefore, have the loan being repaid uninterruptedly.
C. Human Resources Management and Counterparty Risks
The lender can always face opportunistic behavior of the project
company's management, employees, contractors and suppliers who
may not be willing to cooperate with the lender or its substitute if they
decide to step-in. It will also be common for them to use such an
approach with the aim of negotiating better conditions of their respec-
tive contracts. This problem is hard to avoid; however, it is avoidable
if the lender has the power to change the project company manage-
ment as part of its step-in rights and is able to do that promptly. Prior
to stepping-in, the lender should also understand the potential risks
122. Interview with Henry Lee, Jassim M. Jaidah Family Dir. of the Env't and Natural Res.
Program, Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs, Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Gov't
(Feb. 20, 2014) (on file with author).
123. Interview with John T. Wallace, supra note 9.
124. Interview with Henry Lee, supra note 122.
125. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 19, at 22.
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that may be related to its new counterparties. If, for example, the
project company's contractors are experiencing financial distress, it
would not be an advantage for the lender to step-in and deal with
insolvent contractors unless the lender is able to promptly replace
them.
D. Lack of Licenses and Permits Required to Perform the Services
This can be a serious legal impediment to the lender or its nominee
when it concerns "regulated assets" 126 or services, as government au-
thorizations cannot be regulated contractually unless the respective
public authority is a party to the project contract.127 It is obvious that
to mitigate this risk, the licensing authority should assume an obliga-
tion under contract to transfer the license or permit to the lender or its
nominee in case either steps-in. If the authority refuses to do so, the
step-in plan will be at high risk. Some countries try to address this
situation through adopting relevant statutory provisions. For exam-
ple, according to the Turkish Electricity License Regulation, in the
event of the project company's default, the lender who has given loans
to the said project company on a project finance basis, is "entitled to
request from the Energy Market Regulatory Authority transfer of the
existing license of the project company to itself or a new entity, which
will undertake all the obligations of the project company. ' 128 From
this language it appears that it is just a partial measure, as the Energy
Market Regulatory Authority is not obliged to grant the request of the
lender.
In addition, as noted by John T. Wallace, direct owning and operat-
ing regulated asset may have far reaching consequences, as this "may
subject the lender or its parent to unwanted regulation.' 2 9 For exam-
ple, "in the U.S. a lender owning certain types of energy assets may
become a regulated utility requiring extra compliance costs and limits
on future investments. '130
126. Interview with John T. Wallace, supra note 9.
127. For example, PFI.
128. See Deger Boden Aklin & 5eyma Olgun, Turkey Electricity Regulation, GETTING THE
DEAL THROUGH (Oct. 29, 2014), https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/12/urisdiction/54/elec-
tricity-regulation-turkey; see Aliya Bengi Banilman & Orgun Qetinkaya, Turkey Project Fi-
nance, GETnNG THE DEAL THROUGH (Sept. 3, 2014), https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/32/
jurisdiction/54/project-finance-turkey/.
129. Interview with John T. Wallace, supra note 9
130. Id.
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E. Triggering a Step-In Right
Exercising the step-in right primarily depends on the occurrence of
events provided in the direct agreement.131 It is evident that the pro-
ject company is likely to insist on providing within the direct agree-
ment a "very limited and narrowly defined list of triggers.., linked to
material failures or critical circumstances" (e.g. material delay of pro-
vision of services, termination of key supply contracts, etc.). 132 The
lender may push for a broad list of triggers, treating the step-in right
as a "magic bullet" for all service delivery disruptions. In this case,
both the lender and the project company should be realistic when de-
fining the events triggering a step-in right.133 The parties should de-
fine as triggers only those circumstances to which there is not an
immediate remedy. If, for instance, in the case of disruption of deliv-
ery of services, a project company has an opportunity to relocate the
delivery from a primary to a back-up site, that should not be covered
by the triggers.134 The lender and the project company can also stipu-
late for an independent person who will be responsible for defining
whether the event triggering a step-in right has occurred, because de-
termining this moment can also be disputable between the parties. 35
F. Competing Step-In Rights
The projects involving a public authority, such as concessions, may
provide for the public authority's right to step-in and run the project
when it is in trouble. Such a right, for instance, is also called by some
authors a "right to intervene."'1 36 In the case of such a project, the
direct agreement should set the relationships between the right to in-
tervene and the lender's step-in right. Absent the contractual provi-
sions, the approach to be undertaken to this problem should be based
on the legal doctrine of "first in time is first in right."'1 37 However, this
doctrine should be further extended in a way that if the public author-
ity steps in first, the lender should not object as long as the public
authority takes the responsibility for repayment of the loan. If the
lender steps in first, the public authority should not object as the
lender becomes subject to the public authority right to intervene
131. See, e.g., supra Part II.D.
132. McLean et al., supra note 6, at 3.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See VINTER ET AL., supra note 10, at 98.
136. See, e.g., DELMON, supra note 40, at 135.
137. In the US, this approach is well defined in the property law case Palmer v. R.R. Comm'n
of California, 138 P. 997 (Cal. 1914).
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should the lender fail to improve the situation within reasonable
time. 138
G. Competition and Public Procurement Laws
Another serious issue that may arise when it comes to a project
involving a public authority is competition. "The right of the lender to
replace the existing project company with another operating company
is based on the lender's sole discretion. It does not permit an open
offer where the credentials of more than one prospective operator are
considered."'' 39 Therefore, step-in by a lender or its nominee through
substitution could be objectively viewed as violation of public pro-
curement rules. For instance, in Russia, a lender's step-in rights are
restricted: the law does not allow lenders to appoint their nominee in
the course of their step-in; rather, the law requires that a nominee is
selected on a tender held by the public authority.1 40 So, if the lender
finances a project in a jurisdiction limiting the lender's step-in right,
the lender or its nominee has to be prepared to go through the bur-
densome public tender procedures at the expense of the potential effi-
ciency of immediate step-in. 141 Less strict regulations exist in Estonia,
for example, where a public authority may consent to a step-in by
lender's nominee provided that the nominee meets the criteria appli-
cable to a "tenderer under procurement proceedings" and the "eco-
nomic and financial standing and technical and professional
competence of the nominee complies with the qualifications provided
in the contract notice.' 42
H. Adverse Effect on Continuity and Quality of Services
Lastly, even if the lender's nominee is allowed to replace the project
company, if its step-in has not been smooth, it can negatively affect
the continuity of services and their quality. This may lead to the ter-
mination of the contracts with the project contractors, customers, and
suppliers and cause ultimate failure of the project.
Although what has been mentioned above is not an exhaustive list
of possible challenges and constraints applicable to the step-in right, it
138. See DELMON, supra note 40, at 135.
139. See Nagla Nassar, Project Finance, Public Utilities, and Public Concerns: A Practitioner's
Perspective, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 60, 74 (1999).
140. See, e.g., Vladimir Lipavsky, Russia: Construction, GETING THE DEAL THROUGH (Sep.
24, 2013), https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/7/urisdiction/26/construction-russia/.
141. As an option, step-in could be effectuated through transfer of shares in the project com-
pany, subject to this being allowed under the contract with the public authority and applicable
law.
142. See Eespold & Hammerberg, supra note 55.
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is sufficient to reach a conclusion that exercising a step-in right is a
very risky and adventurous undertaking. Having come to such conclu-
sion, should we treat step-in right as something totally impractical and
useless? This it is not an easy question, and it will be reviewed in
more detail in the conclusion below.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article explained the concept of the step-in right. It deter-
mined that a step-in right should be considered as a transfer of con-
tractual rights and obligations the project company has with regard to
its counterparties, to the lender when the project comes into difficulty.
The Article covered contract law regulations of step-in right in the
U.S., the U.K. and France. Although the respective regulations have
some specific features, they confirm that the step-in right (apart from
its "light" cure right variation) can be exercised in a dual way: 1) by
stepping in and holding the project company liable for its obligations
along with the lender or its nominee, or 2) by stepping in and replac-
ing the project company so that the lender or its nominee becomes
solely liable to the project company's counterparties. The reasons for
exercising step-in rights, triggering events as well as various challenges
and constraints related to step-in right, have been discussed.
The research conducted permits coming back to the main question
of this Article: whether the step-in right is a plausible remedy for a
lender in project financed transactions? It is not surprising that this
Article responds to this question with the best answer to almost any
legal question: "It depends." As noted above, the benefit of the step-
in right lies within its protective nature. 143 The financing given to the
project constitutes the value of the project, while the main asset of the
project company is its contractual relationships with its counterparties.
In this respect, exercising security measures against the project com-
pany's tangible assets appears to be the remedy of last resort. Moreo-
ver, when the project company is in trouble, exercising security
measures may cause a "fire sale" which can significantly reduce the
value of such assets. 144 In light of the low effectiveness of conven-
tional security measures, the step-in right appears to be not simply a
remedy that is "nice to have" in the contract but rather a relatively
powerful tool. Indeed, a step-in right allows the lender to interfere
with the project and try to revitalize it before it goes to bankruptcy.
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Banking and Securitization: Asset Fire Sales
and Credit Easing, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 46 (2010), available at http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/
shleifer/files/asset fire sales-aer-pubished.pdf.
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Moreover, the lender can delegate exercising the step-in right to an-
other party, probably one that is fitter to implement these procedures.
In the author's opinion, these features of the step-in right make it a
quite plausible remedy.
But there is still a large room for doubt in assessing the plausibility
of an instrument such as a step-in right. As noted above, there is no
evidence of wide practice of exercising step-in rights. Exercising a
step-in right is not an easy process, and the way to an effective step-in
right runs through a host of pitfalls, some of which could be fatal from
the outset. Practicing lawyers writing about step-in rights also agree
that "enforcement of step-in rights would probably be difficult, if not
impossible in practice. ' 145 So what can be done to make the step-in
right a remedy with teeth, an effective tool to deal with critical project
failures? The answer is quite simple: be more realistic about what is
achievable and what is not, be aware of the mechanics of step-in
rights, rigorously draft and navigate through the contract provisions to
avoid relevant pitfalls. To be more specific, the following measures
might be proposed to a potential lender to increase the efficiency of
step-in right:
" Carefully assess the step-in provision against the assignment rules
of the jurisdiction covered by the project. The lender should be
cautious as to what can be assigned under contract and what as-
signment technics are stipulated or practiced within this jurisdic-
tion. To assure more flexibility in regulation and interpretation of
the step-in right, the lender should prefer common law (such as
English law or law of some of the U.S. jurisdictions) as the law
governing and interpreting the step-in right. Moreover, it would
be advisable to follow the Model Consent to Assignment if it con-
cerns American law.
" Avoid assuming an obligation to step-in, as this obligation may be
used by the project company to avoid its liability following the
lender's step-in.146
* Thoroughly review the technical complexity of the project and as-
sess one's own expertise and capacity to step-in, and take preven-
tive measures by finding a substitute for the current project
company in advance.
* Establish a permanent and reliable oversight mechanism to over-
come the asymmetry of information incident to projects of such
kind. 147 This would allow the lender to be aware of the eco-
nomic, management and legal background of the project before
stepping-in and thus minimize the risks associated with the pro-
145. See Maggiar, supra note 10.
146. See Royal Bank of Scottland PLC v. Chandra, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 105, [31], [2010] 1
Lloyd's Rep 677 (Eng.).
147. Interview with Henry Lee, supra note 122.
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ject company's internal mismanagement or undesirable perform-
ance of its personnel and counterparties.
" Identify all licenses and permits necessary to successfully run the
project and get, if possible, government guarantees on their issu-
ance if the lender (its nominee) decides to step-in.
* Clearly formulate the project company's default events, remain-
ing realistic about what remedies the lender might invoke if any
of such events occur.
" If the project involves a public authority, delineate the lender's
right to step-in and the public authority's right to intervene by
agreeing on the conditions of exercising each of the rights and,
where necessary, provide for subordination of rights.
" Determine whether the potential exercise of a step-in right might
be affected by public procurement laws, and, if yes, be prepared
for the tender by properly negotiating its terms in the direct
agreement and allocating the relevant time and costs.
* Stay tuned to the needs of the customers when stepping-in, as
failure to provide uninterrupted and quality services may result in
losing the customers of the project and ultimate failure of the
project.
Even if upon preliminary analysis it is not clear whether the step-in
right would be effective, it should be noted that it might still be bene-
ficial for the lender. For instance, the lender can use it as a strong
leverage in negotiations. 14 The Eurotunnel case is an example, where
in 2004, when the "concession company was on the verge of bank-
ruptcy, [the lenders] envisaged exercising their step-in rights as stipu-
lated in the concession agreement. ' 149 The validity of step-in rights
was questioned in view of French insolvency laws.150 However, re-
gardless of their validity, step-in rights in this case were used by the
lenders as a means of pressure to obtain a settlement, and the exis-
tence of this threat probably contributed to the successful outcome of
negotiations leading to the 2007 rescheduling and safeguard plan.
Of course, there could be situations when step-in is impossible. In
such a case, even though the sponsors and the project company will
resist, the lender should probably insist on a higher interest rate and/
or sponsors' escrow accounts guaranteeing the project company's per-
formance. Thus, if the lender does achieve an effective step-in right,
that can be viewed as a means reducing transactional costs.
This research confirms that step-in right remains a complex and in-
teresting legal phenomenon that, depen ding on the features of the
particular project and the level of legal techniques, can be a great ben-
148. However, as noted by John T. Wallace, a lender can better use as leverage its right to
foreclose against the project's assets. Interview with John T. Wallace, supra note 9.
149. INTERNATIONAL PROJECT FINANCE, supra note 110, at 380.
150. Id.
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efit for the lender or an absolutely useless contractual structure. It
should also be evident that the concept of the step-in right, comprising
various legal issues, deserves further detailed analysis by academia
and wide practical approbation by project finance participants.
